Supreme Court rules PIAB authorisation not required for emotional distress

The Supreme Court in Dillon v Irish Life Assurance plc [2025] IESC 37 has clarified that a claim for emotional disturbances, such as anxiety, distress, worry, fear, inconvenience and upset, that fall short of a recognised psychiatric disorder are not a ‘personal injury’ within the meaning of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003, as amended (2003 Act).

As a result, prior authorisation from PIAB (now the Injuries Resolution Board) (PIAB) before issuing proceedings solely for such claims is not required.

Background

As set out in more detail in our earlier briefing on the High Court judgment in this case, the plaintiff claimed non-material damages pursuant to the GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018 (2018 Act) for distress, upset, anxiety and inconvenience following alleged data protection breaches by the defendant. The Circuit Court and, following an appeal, the High Court found that the claim amounted to an action for personal injury under the 2003 Act. The proceedings were dismissed as the plaintiff had not obtained authorisation from PIAB before commencing the case, as required by the 2003 Act, and so were bound to fail. The judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court had to consider;

• Whether the non-material damage in the form of distress, upset and anxiety in respect of which the plaintiff sought compensation fell within the statutory definition of “personal injury” in the 2003 Act and thus required prior PIAB authorisation; and

• If prior PIAB authorisation is necessary, does such a requirement  render it excessively difficult for the plaintiff to exercise his right to compensation for non-material damage under the GDPR in breach of Ireland’s obligation to give full effect to EU law.

The Supreme Court held that a freestanding claim in tort or contract seeking to recover damages for emotional disturbances such as anxiety, distress, worry, fear, inconvenience and upset that fall short of a recognised psychiatric disorder is not a personal injury claim within the meaning of the 2003 Act. Any other interpretation would mean that the phrase ‘personal injury’ would deviate from its normal usage by the legal profession and would impose on PIAB the burden of assessing categories of actions that were not within the contemplation of the 2003 Act.  In this case, therefore, authorisation from PIAB was not required as a precondition to instituting proceedings and the appeal was allowed.

Conversely, the Supreme Court clarified that claims based upon medically recognised psychiatric injury will be actions for damages for personal injuries within the meaning of the 2003 Act and will accordingly have to go through the PIAB authorisation process.

Conclusion

Procedural uncertainty has been removed in respect of claims seeking non-material damages under the GDPR for emotional distress but the court emphasised that it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to plead and properly identify the type of loss for which they seek compensation and the precise legal basis on which they do so.

Of particular note in the judgment is the statement by the court that while claims solely for mental distress, upset and anxiety will fall outside the PIAB regime, plaintiffs in such cases cannot expect anything other than “very, very modest awards”. Such a plaintiff, therefore, will need to consider carefully the appropriate jurisdiction for bringing their claim.